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Abstract
We analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms
to produce an output, e.g. electricity from renewable energy sources.
Firms can undertake non-contractible investments to reduce production
cost of the output. Part of these investments spills over and also reduces
production cost of the other firm. Comparing a general price subsidy
and an innovation tournament, we find that the principal’s expected cost
of implementing a given expected output are always higher under the
tournament, even though this scheme may lead to more innovation.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we analyze a situation where a principal wants to induce two firms
to produce an output. The firms can undertake a costly investment to reduce
production cost of the output. Part of this ‘innovation’ spills over and also
reduces production cost of the other firm. We focus on the principal’s choice
between subsidizing all firms or only the most successful innovators.
A topical problem that conforms to this general structure are recent mea-
sures to increase electricity production from renewable energy sources in order
to combat climate change and to reduce dependency on fossil energy. Renewable
energy is not competitive yet, but the hope is that innovations will bring down
production costs (Manne and Richels 2004). Therefore, several countries like
Germany, France and Spain have passed legislation by which all producers of
renewable energy receive a fixed price for power sold to the grid that lies above
the market price. The instrument went quite well in practice. For example,
the share of renewables in the consumption of electricity increased in Germany
from 4.6% in 1998 to 9.3% in 2004 (BMU 2005).
Nevertheless, some decision-makers have suggested that the subsidies should
be focused on the most promising projects only.1 Therefore, we compare the
general price subsidy to an innovation tournament, where only the winner re-
ceives an output price subsidy. This has an additional advantage. Firms disre-
gard the beneficial effect that innovation spillovers have on other firms, resulting
in underinvestment. A tournament may strengthen innovation incentives since
the firms try to outperform each other.
An innovation tournament has substantial similarities with the Non-Fossil
Fuel Obligation (NFFO) in the UK (Cleirigh 2001). Under this scheme renew-
able energy production projects were awarded to the firm who asked the lowest
price for producing a specified output. Intuitively, the firm which realized the
better cost-reducing innovation should win the bidding competition. This is
also the case in our tournament model, which is more simple, however, since it
1See the debate between the then German ministers for the economy and the environment
(‘Clement sucht Konfrontation mit Trittin’, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 02.09.2003, p.
11). Also the new German chancellor Angela Merkel has criticized that “everyone has access
to the subsidies” (‘Schwarz-gelber Mix’, DIE ZEIT, 02.06.2005, p. 24).
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disregards the strategic interaction at the bidding stage. In practice, the NFFO
had only limited success, and it has been replaced recently by a quota system.
We model firms’ choices as a two stage game. In the first stage, firms invest
into an innovation that reduces the cost of producing output. In the second
stage, stochastic innovations are observed and production takes place. While
we assume that output can be contracted upon, contracts based on the value
of innovation are not feasible. The reason is that even if the principal (i.e. the
government) and the firms can evaluate the innovation, such information is usu-
ally difficult to verify by a court. Moreover, we assume that firms’ investments
are not observable. Therefore, we have a moral hazard problem and the first
best innovation/output profile will not be implementable if firms are wealth
constrained.
The government wants to minimize the expected costs of achieving an output
target, e.g. regarding electricity from renewable energies. We focus on two
policy instruments: a general output price subsidy (GPS), and an innovation
tournament such that only the winner receives an output price subsidy. This
restriction to subsidize either both firms to the same extent or only one firm
keeps the analysis tractable. Furthermore, these two schemes seem to be the
most relevant, since guaranteeing firms different prices for electricity that has
been generated from the same renewable energies would probably constitute
illegal price discrimination.
A central feature of our model is that innovation is not completely ap-
propriable due to technological spillovers, which may be substantial even in
the presence of patent protection (Mansfield 1985). Reasons are (i) personnel
movements between employers, (ii) formal and informal networks between re-
searchers such as seminars, publications and casual encounters, as well as (iii)
reverse engineering (see Geroski 1995). The first two channels relate to (in-
put) spillovers that occur during the R&D process. The third channel relates
to spillovers of the final R&D output. The formal analysis in our paper is re-
stricted to the former. However, in the concluding remarks we will argue that
spillovers of R&D output further strengthen our main result.
The analysis focuses on two related issues: innovation investments and the
government’s cost of implementing a targeted output level. Investments may
be higher under the tournament than under the GPS if the stakes are such that
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firms are highly motivated to win the innovation contest. However, research
spillovers dilute this motivation since they reduce the effect of own research
efforts on the chances of winning. Furthermore, a firms ex-ante expected out-
put is higher under the GPS, which increases the incentive to invest in cost
reducing innovations under this scheme. In summary, it turns out that with
perfect spillovers the GPS always induces more innovation investments, while
the comparison is ambiguous if spillovers are low.
However, even in those cases where the tournament induces more innovation,
it always leads to higher expected costs of implementing a targeted output level.
One reason is that we assume diminishing returns to scale of output production,
which favors the GPS where both firms produce. Our model allows this effect
to be arbitrarily small, but in this case the GPS turns out to produce the better
innovation.
Our basic setup is related to the large industrial organization literature on
innovation spillovers. A seminal contribution of this literature is d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988), who also consider the interaction among firms that invest
in cost-reducing innovations. These are not completely appropriable due to
spillovers, leading to underinvestment in R&D.2
Our paper differs from d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and most of the
related literature in several important respects. First, there is no problem of
imperfect competition in our framework. This seems realistic since the mar-
ket share of renewable energies is small so that individual producers have no
influence on the electricity price.
Second, we assume that innovation is stochastic and the related investment
non-contractible. Other papers that analyze stochastic innovation are Mar-
tin (2002) and Gehrig (2004). In Martin (2002) uncertainty is modeled as an
uncertain discovery time. Essentially, he analyzes a patent racing model of
cost-saving innovation in a quantity-setting duopoly. In Gehrig (2004) the de-
velopment of an idea succeeds with a certain probability, and the firm invests
2Related papers are Suzumura (1992) who provides a generalization of d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988), as well as Kamien, Muller, and Zang (1992) who consider spillovers of
research inputs (rather than research outputs). For surveys of the literature on knowledge
spillovers in an imperfectly competitive market environment see DeBondt (1997) and Amir
(2000).
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resources to find out the likely success of the innovation. In our paper, invest-
ments improve the distribution of the stochastic innovation and, thereby, reduce
expected production cost.
Third, there is an active regulator who can use his budget to provide incen-
tives for innovation investments and output production. Hinloopen (1997) also
considers an active government, but he focuses on R&D subsidies, which are
non-contractible in our framework. There is also a substantial environmental
economics literature on the stimulation of technological innovation. However,
most of this literature analyzes firms’ decisions to adopt a known technology
under different instruments such as permits, taxes and standards (e.g., Requate
and Unold 2003; Jung, Krutilla, and Boyd 1996).
Nevertheless, some notable exceptions exist. Fisher, Parry, and Pizer (2003)
analyze endogenous innovation and also allow for research spillovers. However,
in their model only one firm is an innovator, the innovation process is determin-
istic and they analyze different policy instruments than we do, namely taxes
and permits. Biglaiser and Horowitz (1995) considers binary choices whether
to undertake research into a technology that reduces the emission intensity of
production. In Tsur and Zemel (2002), a regulator auctions the procurement
of an environmental project to an individual firm, and conditions transfers to
this firm on the project completion time.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. Sections 3
and 4 analyze the GPS and the tournament, respectively. Section 5 compares
these two policy instruments, and section 6 concludes.
2 The model
There are two ex-ante identical firms indexed alternatively by i, j = 1, 2. In
the first stage, the government commits to a mechanism, i.e. either a general
price subsidy (GPS) or a tournament. In the second stage, each firm under-
takes a non-observable investment, xi ≥ 0, into the development of a process
innovation that reduces production cost. The uncertain and non-verifiable in-
novation output of this investment is ei, where ei ∈ [0, 1] is the realization of a
random variable with cumulative distribution function Fi(ei|xi, xj) = egi(xi,xj)i ,
and density function fi(ei|xi, xj) = gi(xi, xj)egi(xi,xj)−1i . Given xi and xj, the
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two random variables are independently distributed.
The function gi(xi, xj) ≥ 0 is assumed to be strictly increasing and concave
in xi and twice partially differentiable in xi and xj. That is, a higher invest-
ment of firm i improves the distribution of its innovation in the sense of first
order stochastic dominance and, therefore, reduces expected production costs.3
Furthermore, gi(xi, xj) may also increase in xj, which means that there are
spillovers of R&D inputs. However, a firm’s own investments have a (weakly)
more beneficial effect on the distribution of its innovation than foreign invest-
ments. This reflects that spillovers are usually incomplete and that knowledge
acquired from rivals may not fit exactly with a firm’s existing knowledge base
(see Hinloopen 2003). Formally, we assume that
∂gi(xi, xj)
∂xi
> 0,
∂gi(xi, xj)
∂xj
≥ 0, ∂
2gi(xi, xj)
∂x2i
≤ 0 i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, (1)
and
∀x, y ≥ 0, ∂gi(xi, xj)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
xi=x,xj=y
≥ ∂gj(xi, xj)
∂xi
∣∣∣∣
xi=x,xj=y
i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j.
(2)
Furthermore, since firms are identical ex ante, gi(x, y) = gj(y, x) for all x, y ≥ 0.
In the third stage, each firm observes its innovation and produces the veri-
fiable output qi, qj ≥ 0. Firm i’s total production cost after accounting for the
process innovation are given by
c(xi, ei, qi) =
q1+si
(1 + s)eti
+ xi, s, t > 0. (3)
Accordingly, cost of output is increasing and convex, reflecting diminishing
returns to output production. Production cost decrease in the innovation out-
put ei. The parameters s and t describe how responsive production costs are
to changes in qi and ei, respectively. In particular, 1 + s is the elasticity of
production cost with respect to output qi, and −t is the elasticity of production
cost with respect to the innovation level ei. Note that the model focuses on
3For example, if F (ei) = eaxii , a > 0, firm i takes xi identical, independent draws from
the distribution F (ei) = eai . See Fullerton and McAfee (1999) for a similar specification of
random innovations.
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innovation which is ‘essential’ in the sense that production cost rise to infinity
in the absence of innovation.
All parties are risk neutral and firms’ reservation utility is zero. Furthermore,
firms are wealth constrained so that they cannot pay entry fees for participation
in the tournament or for being entitled to receive subsidies. For parsimony, we
assume that firms receive payments for their output and innovation only from
the principal. Accordingly, under the tournament scheme the losing firm which
receives no subsidy will not produce output. This reflects that renewable energy
production is not competitive yet.
It remains to specify the government’s objective function. We assume that it
wants to minimize its expected costs for implementing a given expected overall
output q¯ > 0. In our opinion, this better reflects actual decision processes than
a maximization of social welfare. Especially since the monetarized benefits
of producing electricity from renewable rather than ‘conventional’ energy are
essentially not known. It also emphasizes our focus on problems where the
government is not interested in innovation per se, but in an output that can
be produced more cheaply if innovation occurs. Furthermore, none of our main
results depends on the targeted output level q¯.
3 General price subsidy
The game is solved by backwards induction, and we first consider the GPS. In
the last stage, given innovation ei, firm i chooses output qi to maximize earnings
less production cost:
max
qi
pqi − q
1+s
i
(1 + s)eti
. (4)
From the first order condition, output is chosen according to
qi(p, ei) =
(
peti
)1/s
. (5)
In the investment stage, anticipating qi(·) and given firm j’s investment xj,
firm i solves
max
xi
E
[
p
(
peti
)1/s − (peti) 1+ss
(1 + s)eti
]
− xi = max
xi
pσ
σ
E[eνi |xi, xj]− xi, (6)
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where σ := (1 + s)/s, ν := t/s, and
E[eνi |xi, xj] =
∫ 1
0
eνi gi(xi, xj)e
gi(xi,xj)−1
i dei (7)
=
gi(xi, xj)
gi(xi, xj) + ν
. (8)
Asymmetric equilibria may exist. However, since firms are identical ex ante,
we concentrate on a symmetric equilibrium xi = xj =: xa in the investment
stage. Assuming that p is large enough to induce positive investments, it follows
from the first order condition that, under the GPS, a firm’s investment xa is
given by4
pσ
σ
ν ∂gi
∂xi
∣∣∣
xa
(ga + ν)2
− 1 = 0, (9)
where ga := gi(xa, xa).
5 Implicit differentiation shows that investments under
the GPS increase in the output price. Intuitively, for any given innovation ei a
higher price induces more output (see 5). This makes cost reducing investments
more beneficial.
Using (5) and (8), expected overall output is
qa(p) := E[qi + qj|xa] = 2p 1sE[eνi |xa] = 2p
1
s
ga
ga + ν
. (10)
The effect of spillovers on investments and output depends on the char-
acteristics of the function gi(xi, xj). For example, suppose that gi(xi, xj) =
xi + zxj, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. Implicit differentiation of (9) then shows that
dxa
dz
= − xa
1 + z
, (11)
i.e. investments under the GPS decrease in input spillovers. Intuitively, given
that own and foreign investments are substitutes, a firm’s incentive to invest
decreases as it can absorb more of the other firm’s innovation investments.
However, this need not be the case if investments are complements, i.e. if the
4The second order condition holds since (6) is concave in xi.
5Participation constraints hold under both mechanisms since investing xi = 0 leads to an
expected payoff of at least zero, so that the expected payoff under the optimal investment
must be nonnegative.
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effect of own investments on gi increases as R&D spillovers from the other firm
increase.
From (10), expected output is increasing in ga. Denoting R&D spillovers by
zi(xi, xj) :=
∂gi(xi,xj)
∂xj
we obtain
d
dzi
gi (xa(zi), xa(zi); zi) =
∂gi
∂xi
dxi
dzi
+
∂gi
∂zi
. (12)
While the second term is positive, we have just argued that the first term
may be negative if investments are substitutes. This is the case for the example
gi = xi + zxj, for which the two effects just cancel out so that expected output
is independent of R&D spillovers.
4 Tournament
Under the GPS firms disregard the positive effect that R&D spillovers have on
the production cost of other firms. In order to stimulate innovation investments,
the government may consider research tournaments. Under this scheme only
the winner, i.e. the firm with the better innovation, receives the price subsidy.6
Accordingly, firms have an additional investment incentive since they want to
outperform each other.
The sequence of moves is the same as in the previous section: In stage 1,
the government commits to a price subsidy for the tournament winner. In stage
2, firms invest and the winner is determined. Ties are solved by flipping a fair
coin. Since they occur with probability zero, they are henceforth neglected. In
stage 3, the winner produces output. By assumption, the losing firm will not
find it profitable to produce.
Without loss of generality assume that firm i realizes the better innvoation,
i.e. ei > ej. In the last stage, its problem of maximizing profits for a given
innovation is equivalent to the GPS, leading to output qi(p, ei) as given in (5).
Turning to the investment stage, the expected eνi of the tournament winner
6This requires that realized innovations are observable by the government, but they need
not be verifiable to a third party.
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is
E
[
max{eνi , eνj}|xi, xj
]
= 2
∫ 1
0
∫ ei
0
eνi fj(ej|xi, xj)fi(ei|xi, xj)dejdei (13)
= 2
∫ 1
0
eνi e
gj(xi,xj)
i gi(xi, xj)e
gi(xi,xj)−1
i dei (14)
=
2gi(xi, xj)
gi(xi, xj) + gj(xi, xj) + ν
. (15)
Comparing (8) and (15), for given investments xi = xj the expected innova-
tion level of the tournament winner is larger than the average innovation level
under the GPS. This reflects that the tournament selects the most successful
innovator. However, the chance of winning is only 50 percent. Hence for a given
price p and investments xi = xj, each firm’s ex-ante expected output is lower
under the tournament than under the GPS, i.e. 1
2
p
1
sE[max{eνi , eνj}] < p
1
sE[eνi ].
In particular, anticipating qi(p, ei) firm i chooses investments to solve
max
xi
pσ
2σ
E
[
max{eνi , eνj}|xi, xj
]− xi. (16)
Again, we restrict attention to a symmetric equilibrium, which we denote by
xi = xj =: xt, and assume an interior solution. From the first order condition,
xt is given by
pσ
σ
∂gi
∂xi
∣∣∣
xt
(gt + ν)− gt ∂gj∂xi
∣∣∣
xt
(2gt + ν)2
− 1 = 0, (17)
where gt := gi(xt, xt) = gj(xt, xt). We assume that firm i’s objective function
(16) is concave for every xj so that the second order condition holds.
7
From (5) and (15), expected output under the tournament is
qt(p) := p
1/sE
[
max{eνi , eνj}|xt
]
p1/s
2gt
2gt + ν
. (18)
To analyze the effect of spillovers on innovation investments, consider again
the example gi(xi, xj) = xi + zxj, 0 ≤ z ≤ 1. Implicit differentiation of (17)
then yields
dxt
dz
=
2zxt[2(1 + z)xt + ν] + 4xt[(1− z2)xt + ν]
(1− z2)[2(1 + z)xt + ν]− 4(1 + z)[(1− z2)xt + ν] < −
xt
1 + z
, (19)
7This is case if, e.g., gi(xi, xj) = xi + zxj , 0 ≤ z ≤ 1.
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since the denominator is negative by the second order condition. Comparing
this with (11), R&D spillovers have a more detrimental effect on investments
under the tournament than under the GPS. Intuitively, the higher spillovers,
the lower the effect that own investments have on the chances of winning the
tournament.
We now turn to a more thorough comparison of investments and of the gov-
ernment’s cost of implementing a targeted output level under the two schemes.
5 Comparison of the two schemes
In the previous section we have discussed three effects that determine differ-
ences in innovation investments under the GPS and the tournament. First, for
a given price p and identical investments xi, xj, each firm’s ex-ante expected
output is lower under the tournament. This weakens incentives to invest in
cost reducing innovations under this scheme. Second, the tournament rewards
the firm that achieves the best innovation. This strengthens incentives to in-
vest. Third, the latter effect is diluted through spillovers of research inputs. If
they are perfect, own investments have no effect on the chances of winning the
tournament anymore.
The comparison of the expected innovation level under the two schemes
depends on the relative strength of these effects. With perfect spillovers the
GPS always induces more innovation. As spillovers are reduced, the comparison
becomes ambiguous and it may happen that the tournament performs better.
In particular, with no spillovers the tournament leads to more innovation if the
expected eνi – and therefore the expected payoff – of the tournament winner is
large, since this implies a high incentive to win the tournament. Noting that
E
[
max{eνi , eνj}|xi, xj
]
increases in gi and falls in ν =
t
s
, the following proposition
summarizes these considerations.
Proposition 1 For any given output price p that induces positive investments,
with perfect input spillovers xa > xt. With no input spillovers, xt > xa if and
only if sga > 0.5t(1 +
√
5).
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Proof. Given p, from (9) and (17), xa > xt if and only if
σ
pσ
=
ν ∂gi
∂xi
∣∣∣
xa
(ga + ν)2
≥
∂gi
∂xi
∣∣∣
xa
(ga + ν)− ga ∂gj∂xi
∣∣∣
xa
(2ga + ν)2
, (20)
where the r.h.s. has been obtained from evaluating (17) at xt = xa. With
perfect spillovers, ∂gi
∂xi
=
∂gj
∂xi
, the numerators are the same on both sides of the
inequality sign, and the first statement follows straightforwardly. With no input
spillovers, (20) simplifies to
ν
(ga + ν)2
≥ ga + ν
(2ga + ν)2
. (21)
Given that xa > 0 and thus ga > 0, the above inequality holds if and only if
ga ≤ ν2 (1 +
√
5). 2
Obviously, investments under the two schemes are crucial for the govern-
ment’s cost of implementing a targeted output level. According to Proposition
1, this will favor the GPS more often. In addition, given our assumption of
convex production cost the GPS has the advantage that both firms produce
output, although this effect is small as s approaches 0. On the other hand,
the tournament enables the government to concentrate subsidies on the firm
that has been most successful in reducing its production costs. As the following
results show, it turns out that the effects which favor the GPS always dominate.
Proposition 2 The government’s expected cost of implementing a given ex-
pected output q¯ > 0 are always lower under the GPS than under the tournament
scheme.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume that the government’s ex-
pected costs for implementing a given expected output q¯ are lower under the
tournament, i.e.
pt(q¯)q¯ < pa(q¯)q¯ ⇔ qt(p¯t) > qa(p¯t), (22)
where p¯t := pt(q¯) is the price required to implement quantity q¯ under the
tournament. By (10) and (18), this is the case if and only if at p¯t
2E[eνi |xi = xj = xa] ≤ E[max{eνi , eνj}|xi = xj = xt] (23)
⇔ ga
ga + ν
≤ gt
2gt + ν
(24)
⇔ ga ≤ νgt
gt + ν
. (25)
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A necessary condition for this inequality to hold is ga ≤ gt or, equivalently,
xa ≤ xt. From Proposition 1 and the associated proof we know that this requires
ga ≥ ν2 (1 +
√
5). However, this is in contradiction to inequality (25) which can
hold only if ga < ν. 2
For the tournament to be better than the GPS, there must be a price p
such that qt > qa. That is, the winner of the tournament must produce at
least twice as much output as each firm under the GPS. This would requires
that the production cost function is not too convex (i.e. s is low), and that
the tournament winner’s expected innovation is substantially higher than the
average innovation under the GPS (see 23). However, whenever investment
incentives are higher under the tournament, they are also relatively high under
the GPS. Furthermore, whenever s is low the GPS leads to the better innovation
(see Proposition 1). Therefore, expected output under the GPS is always higher.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have motivated our analysis by the problem of promoting new technologies
such as renewable energies. While not being competitive yet, energy produc-
tion from renewables is characterized by steep learning curves. This has been
captured by assuming that production cost can be reduced by non-contractible
investments into innovations, which partly spill over to other firms. These
spillovers, together with our assumption of diminishing returns to scale, pro-
vide a strong rationale for inducing production from both firms in our model.
However, with non-contractible innovation investments firms disregard the
beneficial effect that R&D spillovers have on other firms. Therefore, we have
considered the alternative instrument of a research tournament, which provides
additional investment incentives since firms try to outperform each other. Fur-
thermore, under the tournament subsidies are targeted at the most successful
innovator. Nevertheless, we find that the government’s expected cost of induc-
ing a targeted output level are always lower under the GPS. Furthermore, in
many cases the GPS also induces more innovation.
Therefore, the paper provides strong support for the system of guaranteeing
a fixed output price for renewables, which has been applied rather successfully
13
in several EU countries. This conclusion seems to be further strengthened if we
allow for output spillovers, which occur if firms learn from each other during the
production process, e.g. through reverse engineering. Accordingly, they would
lower production costs only under the GPS, where both firms produce.
Another issue which has not been considered is that firms can take measures
to prevent spillovers. Since spillovers tend to be more detrimental under the
tournament, firms are more likely to do so under this scheme. Noting that
spillovers are beneficial from a social point of view, this would further strengthen
the case for the GPS.
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